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Introduction: Spain Within the Context of the European 
Crisis
In the context of the Eurozone crisis and under the pretext of 
ensuring Europe’s financial stability and preventing its collapse, 
a number of measures were introduced to recapitalize the banks 
and control national debt. These included the socialization of 
bank losses and policies of austerity (Lapavitsas 2012). The most 
significant policies applied in the Eurozone during this period 
began with the creation of the European Fund for Financial 
Stability early in 2010. This was a rescue package of 750 billion 
euros (FROB 2015). The Pact of the Euro, ratified in June 2011, 
consisted of a series of political reforms aimed at consolidating 
the financial stability and competitiveness of the EU member 
states. This forced them to increase the application of austerity 
measures in order to reduce their deficits and levels of national 
debt (Badenes 2015) and was the starting point for the austerity 
policies of the Eurozone that were subsequently consolidated 
in March 2012 with the signing of the Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance of the Economic Monetary Union 
(better known as the Fiscal Compact). This agreement led to 
the introduction of the Golden Rule, which envisaged economic 
penalties for failure to maintain balanced budgets and limit the 
level of national debt.1
Spain’s road to ruin was built on the circulation of large 
sums of surplus capital, which resulted in the creation of the 
real estate bubble. This fuelled spiralling prices that ended up 
1 In compliance with this rule, in December 2011, the Spanish parliament passed 
a modification of the Constitution that limited the state’s structural deficit to 0.4% 
from 2020 onwards. Furthermore, repaying debt became the highest priority for 
public spending: “Credits to pay the interest and capital on the public debt of the 
Administrations shall always be included as expenses in the state’s budgets and its 
payment shall be regarded as an absolute priority. These credits shall not be subject to 
any amendments or modifications and must comply with the conditions laid down in the 
Law governing their issue” (Spanish Constitution, Article 135.3).
mobilizing middle-class investments and drew in foreign capital; 
in both cases, this was for the direct acquisition of real estate 
through investment funds (Sevilla-Buitrago 2015, p. 38). In this sense, 
the Spanish model (López & Rodríguez 2011) has been based on 
the continuous revaluing of real estate and on the demand for 
owner-occupied housing based on widespread indebtedness 
(Gutiérrez & Delclòs 2016; Gutiérrez & Domènech 2017a). In other words, 
during the years of the real estate boom, the Spanish model of 
accumulation was based mainly on the financialization of the 
built environment (Aalbers 2008; Rutland 2010) via specialization in 
the secondary capital circuit and an extension of the practice of 
savings banks providing cheap credit (Coq-Huelva 2013). This model 
of accumulation had its origins in housing policies promoted 
during the Francoist period and became fully consolidated when 
Spain joined the EU in the 1980s. The main state policies that 
have supported this model are the liberalization of the mortgage 
market and the expansion of securitization since 1992; the 
liberalization of the land market from 1994 onward, which 
removed the majority of the restraints that urban planning had 
placed on urbanization; and a housing policy based on reducing 
the supply of public housing, the marginalization of the market for 
rented housing, and fiscal discounts for the purchase of housing 
(López & Rodríguez 2011). These measures were accompanied by a 
rescaling of the state and a series of strong networks of power, 
including investors, local politicians and savings banks. Within 
this model, which produced what has been referred to as the 
“Spanish miracle,” the key players were the financial institutions. 
The banks financed the purchase of land and construction for 
promoters and the acquisition of housing for buyers, thanks to 
their especially low interest rates (García-Montalvo 2008; López & 
Rodríguez 2010, 2013).
The end of the Spanish model became evident with the 
bursting of the real estate bubble and the crisis of 2008. The great 
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expansion of credit by European domestic economies (the value 
of mortgage debt multiplied by a factor of twelve in the period 
1995–2007, rising from 24 billion to 300 billion euros, at today’s 
prices) (López & Rodríguez 2010, p. 190) led to a rapid increase in the 
number of evictions from 2009 onward. According to data from 
the Consejo General del Poder Judicial (General Legal Council), 
the period 2007-2014 saw over 600,000 foreclosures. Unofficial 
estimates by the Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca (PAH 
– Platform for Mortgage Victims) have set the total number of 
foreclosures resulting in evictions and the loss of first residences 
at above 260,000.
Under the pretext of the crisis, the rescue of Spanish banks 
by the EU has involved the gradual transfer of the debt problem 
from the public to the private sector. This process ensured the 
repayment of money lent to Europe’s banks but also consolidated 
a scenario of increasing social exclusion and vulnerability in 
Spanish society. In short, this situation offered the ideal excuse 
to unfurl an unprecedented process of neoliberalization under the 
name of austerity (Sevilla-Buitrago 2015, p. 42).
Within this context, the main objective of this article is to analyse 
the new financial and real-estate strategies undertaken in Spain 
from 2008 onwards and their translation into a wave of evictions 
due to mortgage foreclosures. To achieve this research objective, 
this article analyses these processes with specific reference to 
the case of Catalunya Banc. This financial institution provides 
a paradigmatic case study: its rescue has implied the active 
involvement of state institutions and resulted in the development 
of mechanisms for carrying out accumulation by dispossession 
(Harvey 2003). Moreover, throughout the processes of rescue and 
nationalization, this bank has remained at the forefront of the 
sector in terms of the number of foreclosures it has carried out 
in Spain (Gutiérrez & Delclòs 2017). Briefly stated, this article seeks 
to highlight the implications, in the form of uneven development 
(Smith 1984 [2010]), of these new strategies, which often remain 
hidden beneath the hegemonic discourse of orthodox economics. 
Along these lines, we shall start by presenting a review of the 
real estate and financial policies undertaken in Spain since 2008 
(section 2). We shall then study the mechanisms used to rescue 
and restructure the savings bank, Catalunya Caixa, and to convert 
it to a new bank (section 3.1). Third, we will analyse the uneven 
spatial pattern of evictions related to foreclosures, using this as 
evidence of their impact in urban areas (section 3.2). Finally, we 
shall consider the conclusions that this research could contribute 
to the study of new scenarios for urban financialization since 2008.
Real estate and financial policies in Spain since 2008
Since 2008, the policies of the Spanish state have been aimed 
at maintaining the financial and real estate sectors as the main 
engines of accumulation for the national economy. These policies 
have been structured around new forms of financial engineering 
within the context of austerity imposed by the European Union. 
This has been particularly evident since the signing of the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 2012. 
During the last bullish cycle, the financial sector played 
a fundamental role in the specialization that took place in the 
secondary circuit of accumulation of the Spanish model (López & 
Rodríguez 2010). In fact, it is important to stress that the Spanish 
financial sector, immersed in the paradigm of financialization, not 
only worked as a financing channel for commuting capital from 
one accumulation circuit to another but also as an accumulation 
sector in itself (Aalbers 2008). Before the crisis broke out, the 
financial sector was basically structured around private banks 
and savings banks. The savings banks had an extensive regional 
presence and stood out for their links to real estate businesses.
When the financial and economic crisis began in 2008, the 
economic unsustainability of this accumulation model became 
evident (particularly in the case of the regional savings banks). 
Official data provided by the Bank of Spain shows that the 
bank bailout received a total capital injection of 61 billion euros 
through public funding (Banco de España, 2014). To this amount, it 
is necessary to add another type of aid that is not technically 
considered public spending, with which the value of support would 
reach almost 108 billion euros, according to data from Spain’s 
Tribunal de Cuentas (Court of Auditors) (BOE 10/08/2014). 
However, the total volume of public money that has been either 
directly or indirectly injected into the financial sector amounts to 
1.4 trillion euros (Plataforma Auditoría Ciudadana de la Deuda 
2013; Sánchez Mato 2013). This aid has been provided through 
different state institutions2 and channelled via the creation of 
other public and “private” entities.3 It has materialized through 
two different types of instruments: capitalization measures4 
(direct injections of capital, the conversion of convertible preferred 
stocks into capital and asset protection schemes) and liquidity 
measures5 (the acquisition of assets, warranties and guarantees, 
credits obtained under advantageous conditions and convertible 
preferred stocks) (Sánchez Mato 2013).
The bank rescue was therefore carried out via two different 
lines of action: sanitizing and bankarization. The first step 
toward the so-called sanitizing of the financial institutions was 
the creation of the SAREB (the “bad bank”). This was done in 
November 2012 as part of the MoU agreement. It involved 55% 
private and 45% public capital, and its aim was “to help to sanitize 
the financial sector and, more specifically, those institutions that 
were beset with problems as a result of their excessive exposure 
to the real estate sector, with the aim of reducing their exposure 
to risk and to liquidate problematic assets in an orderly manner” 
(SAREB 2012). This was followed by the transfer of toxic assets 
to either the SAREB or to investment funds through the sale of 
their real estate portfolios. The contribution of public funds was 
carried out via the FROB and totalled 2.2 billion euros.
The second action included in this sanitizing process was 
the sale of real estate portfolios to private equity funds. These 
portfolios were sold at prices that bore little relation to the 
market price. Furthermore, they were sold with an opaqueness 
that prevented the right of withdrawal of the mortgage owners 
(Vives-Miró 2015). Thus, once more, the business of private equity 
funds was both subsidized and promoted. Both of these actions, 
the transfer of assets to the SAREB and the sale of real estate 
portfolios, have implied the socialization of the losses of the 
real estate business of the savings banks and the conversion of 
private into public debt (Gutiérrez & Domènech 2017b). 
2The aid has been awarded to the financial institutions by the state via loans granted 
to credit agencies by the European Central Bank under advantageous conditions 
and to the state by the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund.
3New bodies such as the Fondo de Adquisición de Activos Financieros (FAAF – Fund 
for the Acquisition of Financial Assets), the Fondo de Reestructuración Ordenada 
Bancaria (FROB – Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring) and the Sociedad de Gestión 
de Activos Procedentes de la Reestructuración Bancaria (SAREB – Company for the 
Management of Assets proceeding from the Restructuring of the Banking System), 
and others that already existed including the Instituto de Crédito Oficial (ICO – Institute 
of Official Credit), the Secretaría General del Tesoro y Política Financiera (General 
Secretariat for the Treasury and Financial Policy), and the Fondo de Garantías de 
Depósitos de Entidades de Crédito (FGD – Guarantee Fund for Bank Deposits).
4Capitalization measures are those used to attempt to solve problems of solvency suf-
fered by financial institutions and to strengthen their capital. In other words, they help 
to bolster their resources in order to allow them to meet their payment obligations when 
all of their resources are insufficient to pay the total amount that they owe (Sánchez 
Mato 2013).
5Liquidity measures are those that seek to give financial institutions sufficient liquid 
resources to meet their payment obligations. In this case, it is presumed that the banks 
and savings banks have sufficient resources to pay their debts, not necessarily in 
the form of liquid assets, but rather in properties, shares, and other types of financial 
investments (Sánchez Mato 2013).
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At the same time that this sanitizing process was being 
conducted, the savings banks were bankarized. The first strategy 
employed involved aggregating the different financial institutions 
into SIP (Institutional Protection Systems) through what were 
known as “cold fusions”, with the institutions maintaining their 
legal identities and obtaining public funds in the process. A 
second step within this process was the nationalization of banks 
with the support of funding provided by the FROB. A new banking-
system scheme emerged from this process in which the number 
of entities was reduced to less than a quarter of the original 
number, with the effective disappearance of almost all of the 
original savings banks. Through this process of bankarization of 
the savings banks, by which the financing sector received further 
subsidies, more private debt was converted into public debt, and 
the financial sector became even more concentrated.
Accumulation of urban rents through evictions by Catalunya 
Banc
New financial mechanisms for the appropriation of financial and 
real estate rent: The state, Catalunya Banc and Blackstone
The creation of Catalunya Banc provides an excellent 
example of the bankarization of the regional savings banks (see 
Figure 1). It began after the creation of the FROB in June 2009 
and the coming into force of Royal Decree Law 11/2010 relating 
to the governing bodies of savings banks and other aspects of 
their legal regimes.
The restructuring process began with the merger of Caixa 
Catalunya, Caixa Tarragona and Caixa Manresa to create 
Catalunya Caixa (1 July 2010) and concluded with the creation of 
the new bank (Catalunya Banc) on 7 June 2011 (Rodríguez García 
2013). It implied the receipt of initial aid totalling 1.3 billion euros 
on 28 July 2010; this came in the form of convertible preferred 
stocks. This was received on condition of the bankarization and 
recapitalization of the group through private investment entering 
its capital before 30 September 2011, as stipulated in Decree 
Law Ley 2/201117 (Europa Press 2010). However, at the end of 
the stipulated period, Catalunya Caixa still had not managed 
to attract the agreed amount of private investment. As a result, 
the FROB intervened once more to the tune of 1.7 billion euros 
(FROB 2011). In this way, the FROB acquired 89.74% of the 
bank’s shares. From this moment onward, therefore, we can talk 
about a process of “nationalization”.
Then, on 20 July 2012, the Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) was signed. As a result of these agreements, in December 
2012 the FROB acquired all the shares in Catalunya Banc for a 
token price of 1 euro. This happened after the 1.3 billion euros 
in preferred stocks in Catalunya Caixa, subscribed in 2010, 
had been converted into shares. Such agreements meant that 
Catalunya Banc received 9.1 billion euros from the ESM and the 
original savings bank ceased to participate in the shareholding 
of the new Catalunya Banc (Lne 2012). After that, the FROB had 
until the end of 2016 to proceed with the process of disinvestment 
in the bank. In other words, it was given four years to privatize 
the former nationalized bank; failing that, it would have been 
liquidated (El Mundo 2013).
In addition to this bankarization, Catalunya Caixa had to submit 
to a process of sanitization. Thus, on 21 December, Catalunya 
Caixa transferred its property portfolio to the SAREB. In total, this 
implied the transfer of 37,000 assets; 27,000 of these proceeded 
directly from Catalunya Caixa, while the other 10,000 were related 
to credits held by the real estate developer. Taken together, this 
operation had a total value of 6.7 billion euros (El País 2012).
Continuing with the process of sanitization, on 16 July 2014, 
the toxic mortgage portfolio of Catalunya Banc was acquired 
by the Blackstone–TPG investment fund. The portfolio had a 
nominal value of 6.4 billion and provisions of 2.2 billion euros. 
This fund, which specializes in the acquisition of financial assets 
with problems, obtained a discount of approximately 40% with 
respect to the total value of the portfolio. In this process, it is 
important to highlight that, in order to promote the sale operation, 
the toxic asset portfolio was transferred to the FTA 2015 
Securitization Fund for its book value of 4.2 billion euros. The FTA 
2015 included participation by Blackstone, with a contribution of 
3.6 billion euros, and also by the FROB, with the remaining 0.6 
billion euros (El Mundo 2014). This Securitization Fund issues debt 
of two types, senior and junior, which are acquired by Blackstone 
and the FROB. The FROB keeps the portion supported by the 
lower-quality (junior) mortgages and is directly affected by any 
potential defaults. In contrast, the senior bonds, which offer 
greater security, are backed by Blackstone.
Figure 1. The evolution of the process of restructuring Catalunya Banc
Source: own elaboration
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It is important to underline here that 59% of these mortgages 
have suffered some type of default (El País 2014; El Mundo 2014). 
In the case of the portfolio becoming profitable in the future, the 
FROB and Blackstone would share any additional yields on an 
equal basis (El País 2014).
With this new contribution of public capital, the cost of the 
rescue for this banking group increased to 12.6 billion euros 
(El Mundo 2014). This new financial architecture has implied a new 
movement of capital through the creation of liquidity based on 
a spatial fix (Gotham 2009) – in this case, a toxic spatial fix. This 
has constituted another step in the financialization of the built 
environment (Aalbers 2008; Christophers 2011).
Via this type of financialization, families holding mortgages 
obtained from Catalunya Banc have seen “the rights relating to 
their mortgage credit ceded to the FTA 2015”. Spanish legislation 
does not allow Catalunya Banc to sell the ownership of its 
mortgages. For this reason, it must continue to administer them, 
even though the debt now belongs to the FTA. However, Catalunya 
Banc has subcontracted its management to Anticipa Real Estate. 
This real estate company, a subsidiary of the bank, has also been 
purchased by Blackstone. In other words, Catalunya Banc is the 
nominal owner of the mortgages, but Blackstone owns the debt 
and is also the owner of the company contracted to administer 
the mortgages. From now on, families with mortgages must, 
therefore, negotiate with the vulture fund (El Diario 2015).
The operation with Blackstone, therefore, definitively opened 
the door to the privatization of the bank. Finally, on 21 July 2014, 
the FROB sold Catalunya Banc to BBVA for over 1.2 billion euros; 
this was less than the 2.6 billion-euro net value of Catalunya Banc 
(El País 21/07/2014). In addition to selling for a lower price than 
the value of its assets, the FROB lost 0.5 billion euros in additional 
guarantees offered to BBVA for the purchase of Catalunya Banc. 
These guarantees have been destined to cover contingencies 
deriving from the sale of hybrid products (preferred stocks and 
subordinated debt), mortgage “floor clauses”6 and “swaps”, and 
an eventual suspension of the bank insurance agreement with 
Mapfre (valued at 140 million euros) (Europa Press 2014).
In short, the rescue of Catalunya Banc has cost 14 billion 
euros in public money, according to official sources (El Diario 2013). 
This amount is similar to the value of the cuts made in health 
and education since 2013 (13.8 billion euros). However, this data 
contrasts with the information presented by Sánchez Mato (2013), 
according to whom the rescue of this bank cost 44.9 billion euros. 
In addition to the aid described in this text, Sánchez Mato also 
considered, among other measures, issues of debt guaranteed 
by the Spanish General Secretariat of the Treasury and Financial 
Policy (10.6 billion euros) and financing received from the BCE 
(14.2 billion euros). These amounts are reflected in Table 1.
Foreclosures of Catalunya Banc fuel uneven development
This section examines the other side of the coin in the 
operation to rescue Spain’s banks: the exacerbation of social 
vulnerability associated with the housing crisis. To do so, it is 
necessary to analyse the spatial distribution pattern of Catalunya 
Banc foreclosures and their contribution to the precarization 
of the most deprived urban areas and neighbourhoods. The 
analysis is based on the Catalonia region, where Catalunya Banc 
concentrates most of its activities and real estate assets. The 
data used in the study was obtained from the registry of empty 
housing units owned by banks, which was created by the Catalan 
Housing Agency and updated in March 2016. This data refers 
to housing units that, following a mortgage foreclosure process 
and after the residents (and owners) have been evicted, are now 
6These clauses, which are not included by all banks, set a “floor” – or minimum interest 
rate – that clients have to pay to the bank, even if the benchmark rate – normally the 
Euribor – drops below this level.
empty and in the hands of the banks waiting for a new profit. 
According to this data, Catalunya Banc is the financial institution 
that holds the second-highest volume of housing units resulting 
from foreclosures executed in Catalonia (2,945 housing units). 
First place in this ranking is occupied by Bankia, and both entities 
have been rescued (and nationalized). This situation highlights 
one of the key characteristics of Spain’s financial sector: those 
banks that have been rescued with public money are also the 
banks that carry out the largest number of foreclosures and 
evictions. In fact, almost 65% of the total number of housing units 
owned by banks resulting from foreclosure is concentrated in the 
hands of entities that have been rescued (Gutiérrez & Delclòs 2017). 
This clearly demonstrates the consequences of the expansive 
policies that these banks pursued during the property boom years. 
Both Catalunya Banc and Bankia pursued aggressive commercial 
policies for the promotion of mortgage credits, resulting in the 
highest quotas of credits with a considerable risk of default 
(Ruiz et al. 2016). This meant that they were destined to become the 
main protagonists of the real estate crisis in Catalonia.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the volume of housing units 
held by Catalunya Banc in Catalonia via mortgage foreclosure 
processes by municipality. The first map shows their distribution 
in absolute terms. As we might expect, this largely corresponds 
to the demographic size of the various cities. In other words, 
the greatest numbers of used housing units are located in the 
most populated urban areas. The first position is occupied by 
the municipality of Barcelona; this is followed by Catalonia’s 
intermediate cities (Sabadell, Terrassa, Lleida, Mataró, Tarragona, 
Reus, Manresa, etc.) (Gutiérrez & Domènech 2017a). However, if we 
utilize a map showing the distribution of used housing units held 
by Catalunya Banc per 1,000 inhabitants as our reference, it is 
possible to observe two very clear territorial patterns. First, the 
particular effects of this phenomenon on the metropolitan area 
of Barcelona can be seen. Along these lines, Gutierrez and Delclòs 
(2015) have shown how, during the decade of the property boom, 
small- and medium-sized towns (with 5,000–20,000 inhabitants) 
tended to concentrate the highest ratios of housing production 
in Catalonia. Among these municipalities, the ones that have 






Asset Protection Scheme 28.2
Subtotal of capitalization measures 87.4
State Guarantees through the 
emission of banking debt 64.1 10.6
Lines of liquidity 3.1 1.2
Implicit State Guarantee for banking 
deposits 792.3
Convertible preferred stocks 2.0
Acquisition of SAREB assets 50.8 6.7
Loans from the European Central 
Bank 357.3 14.2
Subtotal of financial measures 1,269.6
Total risk contingency 1,356.9 44.7
Source: Based on Sánchez Mato, 2013
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concentrated the greatest volume of housing production have 
been those located within the metropolitan region of Barcelona 
and along the Mediterranean Coast. Later, after the real estate 
bubble burst, these municipalities also suffered the main 
consequences of the shrinking of the property market: the highest 
ratios of unoccupied housing, unfinished residential buildings, and 
housing units held by banks (Gutierrez & Delclòs 2015, 2017). Figure 
2 demonstrates how Catalunya Banc has been one of the main 
entities involved in this process. The second characteristic that 
can be observed from Figure 2 is the concentration of housing 
units held by Catalunya Banc in the areas of influence of the two 
smallest savings banks that were integrated into this new bank. 
This can be observed in the province of Tarragona (Caixa de 
Tarragona, in the south of Catalonia) and in the comarca (local 
district or county) of Bages (Caixa de Manresa, in the central area 
of Catalonia). This has allowed us to illustrate the consequences 
of the policies of intense mortgage credit capture undertaken by 
their respective office networks during the years of the real estate 
bubble.
The cases of the cities of Tarragona and Terrassa (see 
Figure 3) were used to demonstrate, at the neighbourhood level, 
how foreclosures of Catalunya Banc have been fuelling uneven 
development. Both cities present interesting cases. Terrassa is 
one of the main cities in the metropolitan region of Barcelona 
(with a population of 215,000). From the onset of the Spanish 
mortgage crisis, it has been one of the cities with the highest ratios 
of evictions due to foreclosures. Tarragona (140,000 inhabitants) 
is the capital of the second-largest urban region in Catalonia 
after Barcelona. In this case, the interest lies in its condition of 
being the headquarters of one of the three savings banks (Caixa 
Tarragona) that would form Catalunya Caixa following a process 
of fusion. As a result, this bank has an important presence in the 
city.
Figures 4 and 5 demonstrate the uneven distribution of 
housing stock owned by Catalunya Banc (the orange points) and 
the rest of the banks (the white points) in Tarragona and Terrassa, 
and their clear tendency to concentrate in certain specific areas. 
The maps also show the levels and distribution of unemployment 
and the percentage of immigrant population by census tract (in 
both cases according to data from the 2011 census).
There is a vast literature on the residential segregation of 
immigrant populations in Spanish cities and the overall tendency 
towards their concentration in the most deprived neighbourhoods 
(in Catalan context: Bayona 2007; Bayona & López-Gay 2011; Martori & 
Hoberg 2008; Pujol-Perdices & Gutiérrez 2017). Nowadays, according 
to our findings, it could be emphasized that in Tarragona and 
Terrassa these neighbourhoods have also suffered a more 
intensive process of home dispossession. From the maps, it is 
possible to observe that the higher the unemployment rate and 
the greater the density of the immigrant population, the larger the 
number of used housing units held by banks in a given area. The 
increase in the number of this type of housing unit per thousand 
inhabitants, the level of unemployment, and the percentage of 
immigrant population in each census tract (87 in Tarragona and 
143 in Terrassa) give a minimum Pearson correlation coefficient 
of 0.58 for Tarragona and a maximum of 0.75 for Terrassa (both of 
which were statistically significant at the 99.9% confidence level). 
Previous studies have also underlined the spatial correlation of 
these variables in both cities (Gutiérrez & Delclòs 2016). Moreover, 
this correlation between social vulnerability and the concentration 
of housing units in the hands of banks has been highlighted in 
other Catalan and Spanish cities (Gutiérrez & Domènech 2017a, 
2017b). In Tarragona, it is relevant to stress their presence in 
Bonavista, Campclar and Torreforta (neighbourhoods on the 
west side of the city). These neighbourhoods constitute 23.1% 
of the housing stock of Tarragona, but concentrate 62.9% of 
all the housing units owned by Catalunya Banc in the city. In 
Terrassa, the higher concentration is observed in the deprived 
neighbourhoods on the east side of the city (Ca n’Anglada, 
Égara and La Marina, among others). In this case, these areas 
constitute 23.4% of the housing stock of the city, but concentrate 
56.4% of the housing units owned by Catalunya Caixa. In 
Figure 2. Distribution of used housing units held by Catalunya Banc, by municipality
Source: Own elaboration based on the registry of vacant housing units owned by banks in Catalonia
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Figure 3. Locating Tarragona and Terrassa
Source: Own elaboration based on the registry of vacant housing units owned by banks in Catalonia
Figure 4. Housing units held by Catalunya Banc and unemployment rates (Tarragona and Terrassa)
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the 2011 census and the registry of vacant housing units owned by banks in Catalonia.
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both cases, these are peripheral neighbourhoods with high 
concentrations of social housing established between 1950 and 
1980 (Roquer et al. 2014). Many of these neighbourhoods have 
been involved in several urban regeneration programmes under 
the Catalan Neighbourhoods Law. This is a regional programme 
aiming to cofinance urban regeneration strategies in the most 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods of Catalan cities. This constitutes 
an illustrative example of their vulnerability. It can be concluded 
that, in both cases, the more deprived the neighbourhood, the 
greater was the presence of Catalunya Banc.
Surveys of evicted families taken by the PAH (Colau & 
Alemany 2012) and qualitative studies undertaken by the DESC 
Observatory (Valiño 2015) confirmed that lower-income families 
were disproportionately affected by the evictions. This clearly 
illustrates the financial practices of Catalunya Banc and the 
former saving banks: they concentrated a much higher volume 
of mortgage credits in deprived neighbourhoods in comparison 
to other financial institutions (with the exception of Bankia). 
Furthermore, this implied taking on a higher volume of high-risk 
loans, a policy that is now taking its toll. Together with Bankia, 
Catalunya Banc is the financial institution that has produced the 
highest number of mortgage payment defaults and repossessions 
in the most deprived neighbourhoods of Catalan cities.
Conclusions
In Spain, the model of accumulation has specialized in 
financial investment in the secondary circuit. As a result, Spain 
has been one of the countries hardest hit by the economic crisis 
of 2008. Subsequently, under the pretext of ensuring the stability 
of the financial system, new forms of financial and real estate 
engineering have intensified the processes of accumulation by 
dispossession and, especially, the number of evictions due to 
mortgage foreclosures.
In this new financial real estate model, the financial institutions 
and private equity funds are the eventual benefactors. Because 
of the state’s role as the promoter of these processes, these 
entities have received both direct and indirect subsidies and have 
seen new financial norms and frameworks created to meet their 
needs. As a result, private equity funds have emerged as new 
agents with a key role in the Spanish real estate market. This has 
implied an important transformation, with the primary owners of 
housing ceasing to be local and becoming global.
These new financial real estate mechanisms have not helped 
to offset either the crisis or the effects deriving from it. Moreover, 
they have served to increase the size of Spain’s national debt 
and to exacerbate social vulnerability as a result of austerity 
policies. These strategies form part of an advance in the practice 
of financialization which, in the case of Spain, is currently 
intensifying, above all in the rental sector. This could become an 
important business niche and would constitute a key innovation 
within the Spanish real estate business. In other words, rentals 
could offer a new solution to the need to absorb excess capital, 
thereby providing a new spatial fix.
Whatever the case, the introduction of new strategies 
requires dispossession. This has been orchestrated through so-
called policies of austerity, the socialization of losses, and the 
conversion of the private debt of the elite into public debt. In 
this sense, with these policies, the state has played a role not 
only in promoting forms of accumulation but also in the process 
of dispossession. The policies applied have left their marks on 
the most vulnerable neighbourhoods of our cities. It is evident 
that they have exacerbated vulnerability and intensified uneven 
development: the more vulnerable the neighbourhood, the 
greater the concentration of foreclosures. Furthermore, these 
foreclosures have been carried out by banks (like Catalunya 
Banc) that were previously rescued with public money.
Figure 5. Housing units held by Catalunya Banc and the percentage of foreign-born population (Tarragona and Terrassa)
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the 2011 census and registry of vacant housing units owned by banks in Catalonia
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